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Abstract
In this paper we analyze Minskian dynamics in the US economy via an empirical application of Min-
sky’s financing regime classifications to a panel of nonfinancial corporations. First, we map Minsky’s
definitions of hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance onto firm-level data to describe the evolution of Min-
skian regimes. We highlight striking growth in the share of Ponzi firms in the post-1970 US, concentrated
among small corporations. This secular growth in the incidence of Ponzi firms is consistent with the pos-
sibility of a long wave of increasingly fragile finance in the US economy. Second, we explore the possibility
of short-run Minskian dynamics at a business-cycle frequency. Using linear probability models relating
firms’ probability of being Ponzi to the aggregate output gap, which captures short-term macroeconomic
fluctuations exogenous to individual firms, we find that aggregate downturns are correlated with an al-
most zero increased probability that firms are Ponzi. This result is corroborated by quantile regressions
using a continuous measure of financial fragility, the interest coverage ratio, which identify almost zero
e↵ects of short-term fluctuations on financial fragility across the interest coverage distribution. Together,
these results speak to an important question in the theoretical literature on financial fragility regard-
ing the duration of Minskian cycles, and lend support, in particular, to the contention that Minskian
dynamics may take the form of long waves, but do not operate at business cycle frequencies.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we explore Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis through an empirical application of Min-
sky’s financing classifications to firm-level financial statements. Minsky (1975; 1986; 1992) puts forward a
theory of cycles defined by an economy’s oscillation between periods of robust financing arrangements, and
periods of financial fragility. Firms are categorized as hedge, speculative or Ponzi, based on the relationship
between their cash inflows from operations and debt service requirements. Hedge structures are the most
robust, generating more than su cient operational cash flows to service both interest and principal obliga-
tions. Speculative firms, in contrast, must roll over principal on maturing debt, and Ponzi firms, which are
the most fragile, must also roll over interest payments. Instability derives from an increase in the proportion
of agents with fragile financial structures. Famously, ‘stability breeds instability’ as periods of robust finance
lead to complacency, greater risk-taking and, over time, increasingly fragile finance.1
Minsky’s work received widespread popular attention in both the press and the policy sphere after the
2008 crisis was hailed as a possible ‘Minsky moment’. An article in The Economist, for example, writes
that, after the crisis began in the US, “everyone was turning to his [Minsky’s] writings as they tried to
make sense of the mayhem. Brokers wrote notes to clients about the ‘Minsky moment’ engulfing financial
markets. Central banks referred to his theories in their speeches. And he became a posthumous media
star...” (The Economist, 2016). Describing the crisis in The Financial Times, Martin Wolf wrote, “What
went wrong? The short answer: Minsky was right” (Wolf, 2008). In the policy realm, then-vice-chair of the
Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen gave a speech saying, “To understand what went wrong [in 2008], I refer you
to Hyman Minsky’s pathbreaking work on speculative financial booms and busts” (Yellen, 2010).
This period also saw a surge in academic research on Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis and
Minskian interpretations of the crisis (for example, Kregel, 2008; Whalen, 2008; Dymski, 2009; De Antoni,
2010; Behlul, 2011; Bellofiore and Halevi, 2011; Vercelli, 2011; Wray, 2011, 2016; Ryoo, 2016). This recent
work builds on a long-standing theoretical literature, largely in the post-Keynesian tradition, that analyzes
Minsky’s approach to financial fragility and integrates Minskian dynamics into growth and distribution
models (for example, Taylor and O’Connell, 1985; Lavoie, 1986; Gatti and Gallegati, 1990; Keen, 1995;
Skott, 1995; Meirelles and Lima, 2006; Fazzari et al., 2008; Wray, 2009; Ryoo, 2010, 2013a,b). Outside the
post-Keynesian literature, Bhattacharya et al. (2011) integrate Minskian dynamics with the literature on
1Minsky (1986) writes, “The mixture of hedge speculative, and Ponzi finance in an economy is a major determinant of
instability. The existence of a large composition of positions financed in a speculative or a Ponzi manner is necessary for
financial instability” (p. 232). Similarly, “the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes
under which it is unstable...[and] over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transitions from financial relations that
make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system” (Minsky, 1992, p.8).
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leverage cycles (Geanakoplos, 2010) to also emphasize financial sources of macroeconomic fluctuations.
Despite widespread attention, however, empirical applications of the Financial Instability Hypothesis are
limited, particularly at the firm level.2 This paper speaks to this gap in the literature via an empirical
analysis of Minskian dynamics in the post-1970 US economy. Our analysis has three parts. First, we
develop a methodology mapping Minsky’s definitions of hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance onto firm-level
accounts, and apply these definitions to a panel of US corporations drawn from Compustat. To the best
of our knowledge, this mapping is the first direct application of Minskian definitions to firm-level data.
Drawing on these classifications, our second contribution lies in a description of the incidence and evolution
of Minskian regimes across US corporations since 1970. We document, most notably, a trend increase in
the share of firms with Ponzi structures, concentrated among small corporations. This rising incidence of
Ponzi firms occurs across sectors and, accordingly, does not reflect an expansion of sectors prone to Ponzi
finance at the expense of more financially robust sectors. We augment this evidence with a discussion of
the previous and subsequent states of Ponzi firms. We find that small firms are increasingly likely to enter
the sample as Ponzi over the post-1970 period, whereas firms of above-median firm size are more likely to
transition to Ponzi from a speculative regime. Furthermore, approximately 30% of spells of Ponzi finance
end with the firm exiting the sample; notably, firms are relatively more likely to exit following a spell of
Ponzi finance, than following a hedge or speculative regime. While the time dimension of available data on
US firms is insu cient to definitively identify a long-term cycle, these results point to a secular expansion
in fragility in the post-1970 US.
Third, we complement this evidence of a secular increase in the incidence of Ponzi finance with a set
of econometric results suggesting that Minskian dynamics do not operate at a short-term (business-cycle)
frequency in the US economy. We use linear probability models relating a firm’s probability of being Ponzi
to the aggregate output gap, which captures short-run fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions exogenous
to individual firms. We find strongly statistically significant evidence that the output gap is correlated with
an almost zero increase in the probability that a firm is in a more fragile financing regime (that a firm is
Ponzi, or that a firm is speculative or Ponzi). This result is robust to a range of specifications, including
variations measuring short-run fluctuations by real GDP growth and by sector-specific output gaps/growth,
2See Nikolaidi (2017), who argues that - going forward - empirical research has an important role to play in complementing
the theoretical literature on Minsky. Recent examples of empirical work on Minsky generally emphasize the sector level.
Mulligan (2013) finds that Minskian dynamics best-characterize leveraged sectors, and that crises spread from more to less
leveraged sectors. However, Mulligan distinguishes industries that more or less strongly exemplify Minskian dynamics, but
does not analyze the distribution of regimes across firms over time. Nishi (2016) analyzes Minskian dynamics in a sector-level
analysis of the Japanese economy, and finds that – despite significant di↵erences across sectors – speculative regimes are the
most dominant in Japan. Notably, while few empirical papers directly engage the Financial Instability Hypothesis, Minsky is
credited in a line of empirical research emphasizing financial factors in fixed investment (see Fazzari, 1999).
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as well as to panel logit specifications. These results are, also, corroborated by quantile regressions using
a continuous measure of fragility, the interest coverage ratio, which also identify small e↵ects of the output
gap on financial fragility across the interest coverage distribution.
Importantly, these results speak to a long-standing theoretical debate regarding the duration of Minsky
cycles, which are sometimes identified as short- to medium-run cycles and sometimes as ‘long waves’.3 In
particular, the analysis in this paper points to a long wave in the distribution of firms across Minskian regimes
in the post-1970 US, rather than short cycles at business cycle frequencies. The distinction has important
implications for understanding Minskian dynamics. On the one hand, short- to medium-run cycles would be
characterized by many firms transitioning across regimes. Palley (2011), for example, writes: “The medium-
term cycle is labeled the ‘basic cycle’ ... The ‘basic cycle’ involves the familiar process of evolution beginning
with hedge finance, passing through speculative finance, and ending with Ponzi finance....[and] operates at
the level of the individual enterprise” (p. 3). Similarly, “Within the Minskian framework, the business
cycle is characterized by the gradual emergence of ‘financial fragility’, and this fragility ultimately causes
the demise of the upswing” (p. 371) (Palley, 1994, emphasis added).
On the other hand, the view that Minskian dynamics take the form of ‘long waves’ emphasizes slower
changes in institutions, regulations, and financing norms:
“In the real world characterized by complexity and uncertainty, agents’ financial practices are
largely a↵ected by norms and conventions.... Changes in these norms and conventions take time
and tend to exhibit inertia. The long-term trend in these elements would not be greatly disturbed
by ups and downs during the course of short-run business cycles (Ryoo, 2010, p. 163).
Wray (2009), similarly, contends that the 2008 crisis was not a ‘moment’, but instead the result of a long-
term systemic increase in financial fragility. Notably, the distinction between short- and long-run dynamics
is evident in Minsky’s own work as well: while Minsky (1957, 1959) analyzes the business cycle, later
work emphasizes long waves of institutional change and stages of capitalism (Minsky, 1964, 1995). Finally,
still other authors consider ‘twin cycles’, wherein short-term Minskian cycles are nested within longer-run
Minskian waves (Palley, 2011; Bernard et al., 2014). The results that we present in this paper contribute a
novel set of empirical evidence to this debate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical definitions of Minskian regimes.
Section 3 describes the post-1970 evolution of financing regimes across US corporations. Section 4 explores
the possibility of business-cycle-length Minskian dynamics, and Section 5 concludes.
3See, for example, Ryoo (2010) who writes that “existing Minskian models do not distinguish long waves from short cycles
and the periodicity of cycles in those models is ambiguous” (p. 164).
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2 An application of Minskian financing regimes to firm-level data
The first step in our analysis is to map Minsky’s definitions of financing regimes onto firm-level data, so as to
classify each firm (in each year) as hedge, speculative or Ponzi. Following Minsky (1986), these classifications
are based on the relationship between a firm’s cash inflows from operations and its interest and principal
obligations on outstanding debt.4 For each firm-year observation we, therefore, identify net sources of cash
for meeting financial obligations, and interest and principal commitments. In line with Minsky’s definitions,
summarized in Table 1, a firm-year observation is hedge if its sources of cash exceed both its interest and
principal obligations; speculative if sources of cash cover interest but not principal commitments; and Ponzi if
sources of cash are insu cient to cover both principal and interest payments. To complement these discrete
classifications, we also construct a measure of interest coverage, defined as sources of cash less interest
payments, scaled by total assets. This interest coverage ratio o↵ers a continuous alternative to the discrete
classifications of fragility: when interest coverage is lower, interest payments are higher relative to sources
of cash, indicating higher fragility.
Table 1: Definitions of financing regimes
Regime Definition of regime
Hedge [Sources of cash   Interest Payments   Principal Payments] > 0
Speculative [Sources of cash   Interest Payments] > 0 and
[Sources of cash   Interest Payments   Principal Payments] < 0
Ponzi [Sources of cash   Interest Payments] < 0
2.1 Data
These classifications are applied to a firm-level panel of publicly-traded US corporations drawn from Standard
& Poor’s Compustat Database. To clean the sample we exclude firms with negative recorded sales, assets,
or interest payments, and limit the sample to firms incorporated in the US. We also exclude financial
corporations, thereby restricting our analysis to the nonfinancial corporate sector. We do so for two reasons.
First, the financial structure of financial and nonfinancial corporations is markedly di↵erent; commercial
banks, for example, cannot be hedge units by definition, given their funding reliance on demand deposits.
These di↵erences in financial structure imply that including both financial and nonfinancial firms would
obfuscate the interpretation of any e↵ects we identify. Second, because nonfinancial corporations drive a
4See Minsky (1986, Ch. 9) for a complete discussion of these regimes. Note that, while Minsky distinguishes between
expected and realized cash flows, our analysis is based on recorded cash flow data and, thus, realized cash flows.
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significant proportion of real economic activity, these firms are of independent importance. The empirical
definitions of cash inflows and cash commitments are introduced in detail in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 below and
summarized, with Compustat reference numbers, in Table 2. Applying these definitions to the Compustat
sample yields su cient non-missing observations to construct a panel with discrete regime classifications
between 1970 and 2014. Because interest coverage does not require data on principal payments, we can
extend this portion of the analysis to 1950.
Table 2: Empirical definitions of financing regimes
Compustat #
Sources of funds
Funds from operations
Income before extraordinary items1 18 + 15
Depreciation and amortization 14
Extraordinary items and discontinued operations 48
Deferred taxes2 126
Equity in net loss2 106
Sale of property, plant and equipment, and sale of investments (loss)2 213
Funds from investment activities
Sale of property, plant and equipment2 107
Sale of investments2 109
Other funds from current activities2 218
Cash commitments
Interest and Related Expenses 15
Debt in current liabilities – Total3 34
Notes payable
Long-term debt due in one year
Trade accounts payable3 70
Current liabilities - other3 72
Notes: 1 Income before extraordinary items is reported net of interest expense; we, therefore, add
interest payments back into this income category to measure sources of cash available to meet financial
obligations. 2 Items with zeros imputed for missing observations. 3 Items evaluated at the end of
the previous year.
2.2 Sources of cash
The firm’s relevant sources of funds are the cash inflows from operations that a firm can use to cover required
financial commitments (interest and principal obligations). To align our regime classifications with Minsky’s
concepts, we define these sources of cash based on two principles. First, cash inflows are measured after
accounting for expenses such as wages and salaries, which have a claim on cash flow prior to interest and
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principal. Second, we exclude cash inflows from activities like new borrowing, new equity issuance, or sales
of financial assets. Doing so reflects that Minsky’s taxonomy describes the extent to which discrepancies
between sources of cash and required financial commitments give rise to new borrowing or financial asset
sales.
Accordingly, we define a firm’s net sources of cash as the sum of funds from operations (Compustat item
#110), other funds from current activities (item #218), and funds from investment activities (items #107 and
#109). Funds from operations constitute firms’ primary source of cash. These inflows include both operating
and non-operating income, which are net income concepts (i.e. net of operating expenses like salaries, and
non-operating expenses like foreign exchange adjustments and moving expenses). Note that, because interest
is an inflow from the ownership, rather than the sale of financial assets, we include interest income within
sources of funds. We also add depreciation to a firm’s sources of funds; while accounting conventions define
depreciation as a cash outlay, depreciation is not an actual cash expenditure and, therefore, does not reduce
firms’ liquid cash inflows. Other funds from current activities include, for example, foreign currency exchange
adjustments. Finally, funds from investment activities include net cash flows from the sale of property, plant
and equipment, and the sale of other investments.
When using these three primary variables to define sources of funds, however, we confront two problems.
First, a large share of observations for these aggregate measures are missing, including - most notably - over
77% of observations for funds from operations (item #110). These missing observations reflect that the less
important components of the aggregate measure are often unreported, in which case Compustat assigns the
observation a missing value. We, therefore, construct our own measure of funds from operations based on
individual components, in which we take the main components of funds from operations ‘as is’ and impute
zeros to missing observations for the remaining components. These adjustments reduce the share of missing
observations for sources of funds to 12.25%.5
Second, it sometimes di cult to distinguish operational cash flows from new borrowing or asset sales
due to financial distress. In particular, three aspects of our definition fall into a gray zone. First, the main
subcategory of operating income, extraordinary items and discontinued operations (item #48), includes
5The main item used ‘as is’ is income before extraordinary items (item #18), which includes net income from operations and
net non-operational income. Because income before extraordinary items is net of interest payments, we add interest payments
(item #15) to this variable. The sum of income before extraordinary items and interest payments is the most relevant source of
funds (both conceptually and quantitatively). We, similarly, take depreciation and amortization (item #14) and extraordinary
items and discontinued operations (item #48) ‘as is’. We impute zeros for missing observations for deferred taxes (item #126),
equity in net loss (item #106, which is an adjustment for the unremitted portion of an unconsolidated subsidiary’s earnings),
and sale of property, plant and equipment and sale of investments – loss (item #213, which is an adjustment for gains/losses
relative to the book value of sold assets). We follow a similar procedure for the two other components of sources of funds
and, specifically, impute zeros for missing observations of other funds from current activities, and for funds from investment
activities/sale of property, plant and equipment (item #107) and sale of investments (item #109).
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inflows from extraordinary contingencies (like fire or flood) that are legitimate to include according to the
principles laid out above. However, this category also includes cash flows that are likely derived from
financial decisions (profit/loss on repurchase of debentures) or business decisions (profit/loss on the disposal
of a division). Some part of these funds could, therefore, reflect the need to service financial obligations.
Second, operating income includes a subcategory of net cash flows derived from sale of property, plant
and equipment (item #107). Again, it is, in principle, impossible to determine if these non-recurring cash
inflows from the sale of non-financial assets reflect standard operating decisions (e.g. selling a subsidiary
because it is not profitable) or financial distress (e.g. selling a subsidiary to meet financial obligations).
Third, cash inflows from the sale of investments (#109) include, among other things, the sale of stake
in unconsolidated subsidiaries; it is again unclear if such divestment reflects business considerations or
burdensome financial obligations. By including these three income categories, we define an upper bound
on firms’ relevant cash inflows. However, classifications excluding these three components co-move strongly
with this baseline definition, reflecting in large part that the main component of sources of funds is funds
from operations.
2.3 Cash commitments
Cash commitments include firms’ non-discretionary financial obligations in each year: namely, interest pay-
ments on outstanding debt and principal payments due that year. This definition reflects that Minsky’s
taxonomy defines fragility by comparing the sources of funds a firm can use to service debt and the pay-
ments that must be made to service it. Accordingly, all discretionary uses of funds – capital investment,
stock buybacks and dividend payments, or the acquisition of stakes in other firms – are excluded from
financial commitments. Similarly, principal payments in excess of debt due that year are excluded from
cash commitments, so as to disentangle required principal payments from a firm’s (discretionary) decision
to reduce its stock of long-term debt.6
We draw interest payments directly from Compustat (item #15); however, no Compustat variable directly
captures principal payments. We, therefore, construct a measure of principal payments defined as the sum
of short-term (current) liabilities (accounts payable, other current liabilities, and notes payable), and the
6Put di↵erently, Minsky’s taxonomy is defined by an ex ante comparison between the sources of funds a firm can rely on to
service debt, and the payments needed to service this debt. It is, therefore, qualitatively di↵erent to classify a firm as Ponzi
because it cannot generate cash from its operations to cover interest, than it is to say that it is ‘Ponzi’ when – even though it
had plenty of cash inflows to cover interest obligations – it voluntarily reduces its liabilities, buys back stock, or accumulates
physical capital such that, in the end, it has to borrow. This second firm is not Ponzi. Including discretionary expenditures
would require us to assume that we can infer this ex ante relationship from an ex post comparison between all sources and all
uses of funds.
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portion of long-term debt due in that year (Compustat items #34, #70, and #72). Because these liabilities
are end-of-period stocks, we define principal payments in year t as a function of these stocks in year t  1.
3 The incidence of Minskian regimes in the post-1970 US
Applying these definitions to the Compustat data generates a firm-level panel in which each firm-year ob-
servation is classified as hedge, speculative or Ponzi. Based on these classifications we describe the incidence
and evolution of financing regimes in the US nonfinancial corporate sector; analyze the sectoral composition
of changes in the incidence of financing regimes; and identify both prior and subsequent states of the most
financially fragile (i.e. Ponzi) firms. To begin, Figure 1 plots the incidence of hedge, speculative and Ponzi
firms as a share of the total sample between 1970 and 2014. Most notably, Figure 1 captures secular growth
in the share of Ponzi firms in the US nonfinancial corporate sector, from 10.8% in 1970 to 31.6% in 2014.
This growth in Ponzi structures is concentrated during the 1980s and 1990s – during which time the share
of Ponzi firms grows from 9.1% to 34.0% – and levels o↵ in early 2000s, peaking at 36.1% of nonfinancial
corporations in 2002. Concurrently, the share of speculative firms declines from 72.3% to 45.4% and, despite
short-term oscillations, the share of hedge firms remains relatively constant at approximately a quarter of
Figure 1: Incidence of hedge, speculative and Ponzi financing regimes
Full sample of firms; 1970-2014
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Notes: The figure shows the share of total firms under each financing regime. Shaded areas refer to
full peak-to-trough periods for real GDP, obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. GDP data is
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained dollar measure); for all other definitions and data
sources, see Section 2.
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Figure 2: Incidence of hedge, speculative and Ponzi financing regimes
By firm size; 1970-2014
hedge
speculative
ponzi
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
R
at
io
 o
f F
irm
s
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Data Year − Fiscal
(a) First Quartile
hedge
speculative
ponzi
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
R
at
io
 o
f F
irm
s
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Data Year − Fiscal
(b) Fourth Quartile
Notes: The figure shows the share of firms in the first and fourth quartiles of the asset distribution, respectively,
under each financing regime. Quartiles are defined by percentile of the asset distribution in each year. Shaded areas
refer to full peak-to-trough periods for real GDP, obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. GDP data is from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained dollar measure); for all other definitions and data sources, see Section 2.
firms over the full period.
The increased share of Ponzi firms is primarily driven by growth in the number of small firms that are
Ponzi. Figures 2a and 2b reproduce Figure 1 for firms in the top and bottom quartile of the asset distribution
in each year. In the case of the largest quartile, Figure 2b illustrates that, on average, almost 70% of firms
are speculative, and that the composition of financing regimes among this largest quartile of firms does not
trend significantly over time. Growth in Ponzi finance over the post-1970 period is, instead, largely driven
by an increased share of small firms with Ponzi structures, from 20.7% to 74.0% between 1970 and 2014.
Importantly, small firms are most often Ponzi due to negative sources of cash, as opposed to high financial
commitments. Table 3 summarizes the share of small Ponzi firms with negative values for our measure of
sources of cash by decade, as well as the share of small Ponzi firms with, specifically, negative funds from
operations. While 18.2% of firms in the bottom quartile of the asset distribution reported negative funds
from operations in 1970, this proportion was 68.1% by 2014. Thus, Table 3 points to a growing share of small
firms with negative sources of cash, largely due to negative operational income (income before extraordinary
items), which, as described above, is firms’ primary source of cash. This result is striking: a growing share
of small firms e↵ectively report losses after operational expenses are deducted from revenues. Given that
these are firms that have had access to equity finance, this result suggests that sustained changes in financial
practices are an important driver of the increased share of Ponzi firms (discussed further in Section 3.3).
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Table 3: Negative sources of cash and negative funds from operations
Percentage of small Ponzi firms
Sources of cash Funds from operations N
1970 18.2% 18.2% 849
1980 18.3% 23.6% 1315
1990 47.6% 50.6% 1448
2000 64.6% 67% 1851
2014 68.1% 69.6% 1216
Notes: The table describes the share of Ponzi firms in the first quartile of the yearly asset distribution
with negative total sources of cash and with negative funds from operations (the main component of firms’
sources of cash) by decade. N refers to number of firms. For definitions and data sources, see Section 2.
Figure 3: Hedge, speculative and Ponzi financing regimes as shares of total assets
By firm size; 1970-2014
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Notes: The figure shows the asset-weighted shares of all firms under each financing regime. Shaded
areas refer to full peak-to-trough periods for real GDP, obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
GDP data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained dollar measure); for all other definitions
and data sources, see Section 2.
Figure 3 turns to the share of total assets under each financing regime. Consistent with the fact that the
increased incidence of Ponzi finance is concentrated among small firms, Figure 3 illustrates that the share
of total assets across financing regimes is relatively stable in the post-1970 US. Similarly, the share of total
assets under Ponzi regimes is small, with at least 90.6% of assets under hedge or speculative regimes in each
year.7 Finally, Figure 4 extends this evidence to the interest coverage ratio, which provides a continuous
counterpart to the discrete regime classifications in Figures 1-3. Figure 4 plots this measure of fragility
between 1970 and 2014 for the full sample of firms, as well as for firms in the bottom and top quartile
7These patterns hold when hedge, speculative and Ponzi financing regimes are instead measured as shares of capital expen-
ditures or sales, with the exception that, when measured relative to capital expenditures, the share of hedge firms rises relative
to the share of speculative firms.
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of the asset distribution. Consistent with the evidence in Figure 3 we note, first, that there is very little
trend in the interest coverage ratio for the full sample of firms. Furthermore, Figure 4 reiterates substantial
heterogeneity by firm size. Namely, while the largest quartile of firms closely follows the full sample trend,
there is a marked decline in interest coverage among small firms, capturing increased fragility. Average
interest coverage (as a ratio of total assets) among firms in the bottom quartile of the asset distribution is
-0.076 (implying that the average small firm is in a Ponzi regime), but rises to approximately 0.10 among
firms in the remaining quartiles. Thus, while we largely frame the discussion in this section in terms of the
discrete regime classifications that are widely associated with Minsky’s work, it is important to note that
these discrete classifications present trends consistent with this alternative, continuous measure of financial
fragility.
Figure 4: The interest coverage ratio
Full sample of firms, top and bottom quartile; 1970-2014
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Notes: The figure shows median interest coverage as a ratio of total assets for the full sample of firms, and
for firms in the top and bottom quartile of the interest coverage distribution. Interest coverage is defined
as sources of cash less interest payments, normalized by total assets. Quartiles are defined by percentile
of the asset distribution in each year. Shaded areas refer to full peak-to-trough periods for real GDP,
obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. GDP data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained
dollar measure).
3.1 Do sectoral changes drive the growth in Ponzi firms?
While Figure 2 establishes a remarkable increase in the share of Ponzi firms in the 1980s and 1990s con-
centrated among smaller firms, public discourse often attributes changes in financing behavior to structural
changes in the US economy, particularly the rise of information and communication technologies (ICT). Sto-
ries of startup firms raising funds on the stock market before turning a profit are familiar to most observers,
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and for good reason. Indeed, as of September 2016, there were 155 such startup companies valued at one
billion dollars or more by their venture-capital backers (Austin et al., 2015). All these firms had access to
equity financing. Since their current cash flows may fall short of their financial commitments, they may be
classified as Ponzi in our analysis.
However, a sectoral decomposition indicates that growth in Ponzi firms is not driven by growth in ICT
or, in fact, by any particular industry. Accordingly, the rising share of Ponzi firms primarily reflects changes
within sectors (in proportion to their relative importance in the sample), rather than a large-scale expansion
of sectors prone to Ponzi finance at the expense of more financially robust sectors. To show this, we decompose
the change in the aggregate incidence of Ponzi regimes, by decade, into two components: a ‘within-sector’
component that measures changes in the incidence of Ponzi regimes within sectors, and a ‘between-sector’
or ‘structural change’ component that holds the incidence of Ponzi regimes within sectors fixed. Appendix
A1 provides details on the sectoral classifications, as well as the shift-share methodology used in the sectoral
decomposition.8
Table 4: Shift-share decomposition of changes in the aggregate share of Ponzi firms
  Share of Ponzi Firms (p.p.) Decomposition
Within-Sector (%) Structural Change (%)
1970-1980 -1.7 95.5 4.5
1980-1990 15.0 96.9 3.1
1990-2000 9.8 85.2 14.8
2000-2014 -2.4 55.2 44.8
Notes: The first column shows the percentage point change in the aggregate share of Ponzi firms between
the final year and the initial year of the period. The second and third columns show the decomposition
of this change into the within-sector and the structural change components, as a percentage of the total
change. For details on the sectoral decomposition and the shift-share methodology, see Appendix A1. For
definitions and data sources, see Section 2.
Table 4 shows the results of this decomposition.9 The first column shows the percentage point change
in the aggregate share of Ponzi firms over each decade. Consistent with Figures 1 and 2, the lion’s share of
the increase in the share of Ponzi firms occurs in the 1980s (15 percentage points) and 1990s (9.8 percentage
points). The percentage point changes in the share of Ponzi firms between 1970-1980 and 2000-2014 are,
in contrast, slightly negative. The final two columns decompose the change in the aggregate share of Ponzi
firms into within-sector and structural change components, each as a percentage of the aggregate change.
8We divide firms into thirteen sectors, based, first, on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and also including, second,
three ‘high-tech’ sectors: high-tech manufacturing, communications services, and software and computer-related services. The
summary statistics in Appendix A1 point to substantial variation in the share of Ponzi firms both over time and across sectors
(Table 13 in Appendix A1). Notably, nearly all sectors display an increased share of Ponzi between 1980 and 2000, when the
bulk of the growth in Ponzi takes place.
9Figure 5 in Appendix A1 includes a visual representation of the decomposition that describes sectoral contributions to the
change in the aggregate share of Ponzi firms by decade.
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This decomposition highlights that – while both within-sector change and structural change contribute to
the expansion of Ponzi finance during the 1980s and 1990s – the contribution of the within-sector component
is clearly dominant in both decades, accounting for nearly 97% of the aggregate change between 1980 and
1990, and 85% between 1990 and 2000. Accordingly, most sectors contribute to the rising incidence of Ponzi
regimes during the 1980s and 1990s.10
In the case of ICT, in particular, we note that – despite within-sector increases in Ponzi finance – the
contribution of ICT sectors to growth in Ponzi finance during the 1980s is modest, reflecting that ICT
constitutes a small share of the sample at this time. During the 1990s, in contrast, high-tech manufacturing
and other ICT sectors contribute substantially to the expansion of Ponzi finance, with each exceeding 20% of
the aggregate change. This contribution reflects, in part, the expansion of high-tech among publicly traded
firms during the 1990s; for example, over a third of the contribution of software and computing services
to the expansion of Ponzi finance stems from expansion of the sector (the structural change component).
However, growth in the incidence of Ponzi is common across most other sectors during the 1980s and 1990s
as well, reiterating the main conclusion that the expansion of Ponzi finance is a generalized phenomenon,
reflecting mutually-reinforcing within-sector trends (where larger sectors have larger weights), and is not
primarily due to increased access to equity finance by technology firms.11
3.2 Pre and post Ponzi history
Generalized growth in the share of financially fragile firms across sectors raises questions about both the
previous and subsequent states of Ponzi firms. Does the increase in Ponzi finance reflect a trend wherein
firms increasingly enter the sample as Ponzi, or do a significant proportion of firms transition into Ponzi from
hedge or speculative regimes? Similarly, do Ponzi firms subsequently exit the sample, or do they transition
back to other regimes? These questions are closely tied to the distinction between a ‘basic cycle’ in which
Minskian dynamics are characterized by many firms passing through each regime (Palley, 1994, 2011) and
10Manufacturing contributes significantly to the increased aggregate incidence of Ponzi finance during both the 1980s and
1990s, reflecting in part manufacturing’s large share of the nonfinancial corporate sector. During the 1980s, for example,
traditional manufacturing makes the largest contribution to the increased aggregate share of Ponzi firms (34% of the observed
increase), reflecting a large within-sector expansion of Ponzi firms (from 0.8% to 23%), but also that manufacturing is the largest
sector in the sample. In the 1990s, as well, traditional manufacturing contributes just under 30% of the aggregate increase in
Ponzi firms.
11While there is a small overall change in the aggregate share of Ponzi firms between 2000 and 2014, this is the only period
with a sizable proportional contribution of structural change. During 2000-2014, most sectors — including ICT — record
negative within-sector contributions to Ponzi. While these negative within-sector changes would have lowered the aggregate
share of Ponzi firms by 6.8 percentage points between 2000 and 2014, the decline is almost entirely o↵set by an increased share
of traditional manufacturing firms that are Ponzi. Thus, with the quantitatively important exception of manufacturing, there
is suggestive evidence that, several years after the burst of the dotcom bubble in the early 2000s and the 2008 financial crisis,
financial robustness increased in most sectors.
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a long wave transformation of the economy towards increased fragility (Wray, 2009; Ryoo, 2010; Bernard
et al., 2014).
Table 5: Status of firms in year before transitioning to Ponzi
Full sample and by size quartile
Full sample Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
From missing 36.2% 50.1% 27.7% 15.6% 10.5%
Joined 17.7% 25.9% 11.9% 6.2% 4.3%
First after missing 13.8% 18.0% 11.6% 7.3% 4.5%
Reappear after missing 4.7% 6.2% 4.2% 2.1% 1.7%
Hedge 10.4% 9.7% 11.1% 10.5% 12.9%
Speculative 53.4% 40.2% 61.2% 74.0% 76.6%
Notes: Firms can transition to Ponzi from hedge or speculative finance, or from a previously missing
observation. Previously missing observations can be divided between: (1) firms that join Compustat for
the first time in t; (2) firms that were already in Compustat, are missing a regime classification in t 1, and
are now receiving a regime assignment for the first time; and (3) firms that were already in Compustat,
are missing a regime classification in t   1, but did have a regime classification in some previous period.
Quartiles are defined by percentile of the asset distribution in each year. For definitions and data sources,
see Section 2.
Firms that become Ponzi in year t can enter Ponzi from one of three previous states: (1) the firm can
enter as Ponzi in t; (2) the firm can transition from being in a speculative regime in t 1, or (3) the firm can
transition from being in a hedge regime in t   1. Table 5 summarizes the shares of each type of transition
for the full sample and by firm size quartile for the full post-1970 period. These summary statistics, also,
further divide firms entering as Ponzi in year t into three sub-categories: firms joining Compustat for the
first time; firms already in the sample that did not have su cient data for a regime assignment in year t  1;
and firms already in the sample, also missing a regime classification in t  1, but that had a previous regime
assignment in at least one year. Table 5 points to two di↵erent stories by firm size. Among large firms, as in
the full sample, firms most often become Ponzi from a previously speculative state. In contrast, small firms
are more likely to join the sample as Ponzi. It is, furthermore, notable that small firms have increasingly
entered the nonfinancial corporate sector with fragile financing structures over the post-1970 period. In
1970-1974, 50.3% of firms in the smallest quartile became Ponzi from a previously speculative regime; this
share falls to 23.4% in 2010-2014. In contrast, the share of firms in the first quartile entering Ponzi from
‘missing’ rose from 38.5% in 1970-1974 to 70.8% in 2010-2014.12 This trend corroborates a hypothesis that
the growing incidence of Ponzi firms reflects an increased number of small corporations that IPO with fragile
financial structures (due to negative sources of cash).
12In 1970-74, 26% of Ponzi firms in the first quartile ‘joined’ the sample; 10.9% were ‘first after missing’, and 1.6% ‘reappear
after missing’. In 2010-14, 27.5% of Ponzi firms in the first quartile ‘joined’ the sample; 37.3% were ‘first after missing’ and
6.0% ‘reappear after missing’.
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An equally interesting question concerns what happens after a firm finds itself in a Ponzi regime. Table 6
summarizes the incidence of Ponzi firms’ subsequent states for the full sample and by size quartile. These
statistics highlight that, across firm size, a majority of spells of Ponzi finance (almost 60%) end when a firm
transitions to a more robust financing regime, but that almost a third of Ponzi spells (30.2%) end with exit.
This general pattern holds across firm size, with the notable exception that small firms more often exit the
sample after a period of Ponzi finance than large firms. Table 6 also includes the possibilities that a firm is
still Ponzi when the sample ends in 2014, and that Ponzi firms – after a spell of being Ponzi – have a missing
observation for financing regime. Approximately 6% of spells of Ponzi finance were ongoing in the last year
of our sample and, in a small number of cases, we cannot observe the post-switch state due to missing data
(4.6%).
Table 6: Status of firms transitioning out of a Ponzi regime
Full sample and by size quartile
Full sample Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Hedge 9.3% 9.6% 9.3% 8.5% 8.9%
Speculative 49.8% 40.4% 54.3% 66.1% 73.3%
Exit 30.2% 36.1% 27.4% 21.1% 13.0%
End of sample 6.1% 8.3% 5.2% 1.7% 1.6%
Missing obs. 4.6% 5.8% 3.8% 2.6% 3.2%
Notes: Firms can transition out of Ponzi to a hedge or speculative regime; exit the sample; still be Ponzi
in the last year for which we have available data; or have a missing regime classification following Ponzi
finance. ‘Exit’ includes cases for which a Ponzi spell is followed by a missing observation, after which the
firm exited the sample (2.7% of all transitions). The shares in this table are computed after adjusting the
sample to exclude firms with gaps (0.64% of total firms). Quartiles are defined by percentile of the asset
distribution in each year. For definitions and data sources, see Section 2.
While Table 6 indicates that Ponzi firms more often switch to a more robust regime than exit the sample,
the question remains of whether firms are more likely to exit after a spell of Ponzi finance compared to firms
in more robust regimes.13 While a full econometric analysis of the determinants of exit hazard is beyond
the scope of this paper, simple descriptive statistics suggest that a spell of Ponzi finance is associated with a
greater likelihood of exiting the sample, as compared to being in a more robust regime – even when controlling
for firm size quartile. To show this, we compare the distribution of regimes in the year before exit to the
unconditional likelihood that a firm is Ponzi in any given year. Panel 1 of Table 7 shows the distribution
of regimes among exiting firms in the year before they exit. The last column shows that, across firm size,
37.4% of exiting firms are Ponzi in the previous year. Panel 2 of Table 7 shows the unconditional likelihood
that a firm is Ponzi in any given year. The last column shows that 21.5% of all firms are Ponzi in any given
year. The 16 percentage point di↵erence suggests that being in a Ponzi regime enhances the likelihood of
13Unfortunately, due to data limitations we cannot identify the reason for exit. A firm may exit because it has gone bankrupt;
because it has merged with or been acquired by another firm; or because it has become privately held.
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exiting the sample in the subsequent year, relative to other regimes. In contrast, the opposite relationship
characterizes hedge and speculative regimes: the likelihood of being hedge or speculative is higher in any
given year than it is in the year before exiting the sample.
Table 7: Distribution of financing regimes
Full sample and by size quartile
Panel 1: Distribution of Finance Regimes in Year Before Exit
Size Quartiles
1 2 3 4 Total
Hedge 8.0% 19.0% 24.8% 27.1% 17.5%
Speculative 24.9% 48.7% 59.8% 65.5% 45.1%
Ponzi 67.1% 32.3% 15.3% 7.5% 37.4%
Panel 2: Unconditional Distribution of Finance Regimes
Size Quartiles
1 2 3 4 Total
Hedge 13.5% 23.4% 27.7% 30.3% 23.6%
Speculative 35.3% 54.9% 63.9% 66.2% 54.9%
Ponzi 51.2% 21.7% 8.3% 3.5% 21.5%
Notes: The first panel shows the distribution of finance regimes in the year before firms exit the sample,
when exit occurs before 2014. The first four columns further condition the distribution by size quartiles,
while the last column shows the distribution across all exiting firms. The second panel shows the uncondi-
tional (on exiting) distribution of regimes. All entries are expressed as a percentage of the total non-missing
observations for the finance regime. Quartiles are defined by percentile of the asset distribution in each
year. For definitions and data sources, see Section 2.
Table 7, also, indicates that this pattern holds when conditioning on size quartiles. For example, we
can compare the likelihood that a firm in the smallest quartile is Ponzi the year before it exits (67.2%) to
the unconditional likelihood (51.2%) that a firm is Ponzi — again, a 16 percentage point di↵erence. These
probability di↵erentials fall as size increases; however, the sign is preserved. Thus, across all quartiles, but
more strongly so among smaller firms, firms are less likely to be hedge or speculative, and more likely to be
Ponzi, the year preceding exit as compared to any given year.
3.3 A long wave of increasingly fragile finance?
The evidence in this section is consistent with the possibility of a long wave of increasingly fragile finance in
the post-1970 US economy. In particular, the expanding share of Ponzi structures points to a secular shift
in the structure of the nonfinancial corporate sector, extending across multiple business cycles, towards an
increasing prevalence of fragile financial structures. Evidence regarding the previous and subsequent states
of Ponzi firms further corroborate the possibility of a long Minskian wave. Perhaps most notably, a striking
number of Ponzi firms enter the sample – i.e. go public – with a Ponzi structure due, in particular, to
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negative sources of funds.14 This expansion of Ponzi entrants is arguably indicative of changing financial
norms and conventions. More specifically, the fact that a growing share of (small) firms have access to equity
finance despite negative operational income suggests that institutional changes in financial practices are an
important driver of the increased share of Ponzi firms. Furthermore, the expansion of Ponzi – specifically
among small firms – is due to ‘new entry’ as much as transitions from hedge and speculative regimes. Together
with the finding that Ponzi firms are more likely to subsequently exit the sample as compared to hedge or
speculative firms, these descriptive findings suggest that the primary source of Minskian dynamics in the
post-1970 US does not lie in a ‘basic cycle’, wherein the expansion of financial fragility derives primarily
from the movement of individual enterprises from hedge, through speculative, and to Ponzi finance (Palley,
2011), and instead corroborates the possibility of a long wave.
The sectoral decomposition further supports this possibility of a long wave. In particular, the expansion
of Ponzi finance occurs across sectors, such that – rather than being indicative of structural change in the US
economy wherein a financially fragile sector grows at the expense of a robust sector – there is a broad-based
expansion of fragile structures. This widespread expansion in Ponzi structures again points to a broad change
in financial norms and practices, wherein – across the US economy – the financial norms by which firms
enter the sample of publicly-traded companies have changed. Together, the descriptive findings in Section
3 are consistent with a set of the literature on Minskian dynamics that emphasizes long waves in financing
practices, defining, for example, long waves as stages of capitalism (Minsky, 1964, 1995; Wray, 2009; Ryoo,
2010; Bernard et al., 2014).
Thus, while the length of the available data on the US nonfinancial corporate sector makes it impossible
to definitively identify a long wave, the descriptive evidence in this section establishes a set of stylized
facts consistent with a long-term shift in financing norms towards an increasing incidence of financially
fragile structures in the US nonfinancial corporate sector. Notably, however, because the expansion in Ponzi
structures is concentrated among small firms, the asset-weighted share of firms in more fragile financing
positions does not trend upwards over the same period. This low asset-weighted share of Ponzi raises an
important question regarding whether the trends documented here point to greater systemic fragility. In
this regard it is important to keep in mind that, in analyzing the nonfinancial corporate sector, ‘small’ firms
are still relatively large.
It is also notable that Figure 3 captures a clear lack of an increased share of assets under financially
fragile regimes (both speculative and Ponzi) after the onset of the 2008 crisis. Put di↵erently, Figures 1-3
14This expansion of Ponzi entrants to the nonfinancial corporate sector occurs despite a marked decline in new entrants
during this time period (Gutie´rrez and Philippon, 2016).
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do not point to a ‘Minsky moment’ within the nonfinancial corporate sector in 2008.15 There are at least
three possible interpretations of this finding. First, if Minskian dynamics take the form of long waves, the
evolution of financial norms may be slow moving: even if norms begin to evolve after a crisis, regime shifts
need not align with the business cycle. Second, and perhaps more important, this paper analyzes nonfinancial
corporations, whereas the 2008 crisis was largely located in the household sector and was prompted by a
housing price collapse (for a discussion of this point in a Minskian framework see Dymski, 2009).16 In the
context of nonfinancial firms, Minskian dynamics are most often located in investment booms. However,
investment rates in the nonfinancial corporate sector slowed in the decades prior to 2008, despite rising
profitability. This ‘investment-profit puzzle’ (Stockhammer, 2005; Van Treeck, 2008) suggests that – quite
in contrast to an investment-led boom – the profit-investment link that is central to Minskian dynamics in
the nonfinancial corporate sector, has weakened over the period of analysis. Financial firms, which were also
central to the dynamics of the 2008 crisis, are similarly excluded from the sample.
It is, third, interesting to note that the majority of large firms are speculative and, therefore, rely on
access to short-term financing to roll over debt. When the market for short-term corporate debt (commercial
paper) froze during the financial crisis, these firms were directly vulnerable to the possibility that investors
would be unwilling to refinance maturing commercial paper. Notably, however, the commercial paper market
was supported during the crisis by direct (and unprecedented) Federal Reserve purchases of commercial paper
(Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2010). Thus, the policy response to the crisis conceivably mitigated the likelihood
of a Minsky moment within the nonfinancial corporate sector – at least among these (primarily large) firms
that are heavily reliant on short-term commercial paper for financing.
4 Short-term cycles? Financial fragility and the business cycle
The descriptive evidence in Section 3 points to a possible long wave of increasingly fragile financing ar-
rangements in the post-1970 US economy; however, the possibility remains that shorter-term Minsky cycles
are ‘nested’ within this long-term trend. In this section we, therefore, explore the possibility of short-term
Minsky cycles by analyzing the link between macroeconomic fluctuations (at a business-cycle frequency) and
a firm’s probability of being in a more fragile financing regime. We present two sets of estimations: the first
set uses the discrete classifications from the previous sections, and the second turns to the interest coverage
ratio. Both sets of estimations point to an almost-zero contemporaneous relationship between the cyclical
15This conclusion is consistent with Behlul (2011) who finds, at the aggregate level, that the balance sheet of the nonfinancial
corporate sector did not become more precarious following the crisis.
16See also Tymoigne (2014) for an analysis of increased financial fragility in residential housing beginning in the early 2000s.
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component of output (the output gap) and financial fragility, suggesting that Minskian dynamics do not
operate at a business-cycle frequency over this period in the US economy.
4.1 The probability of being Ponzi
To explore the impact of short-term business cycle fluctuations on firm-level financial fragility, we begin with
a set of linear probability models estimating the relationship between fluctuations in economic conditions
external to individual firms and the probability that a firm is Ponzi. We draw on two measures of business
cycle fluctuations: the (normalized) cyclical component of US GDP extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter, and real GDP growth.17 Results from these estimations are shown in Tables 8 and 9, respectively.
Table 8: Linear probability models, probability of being Ponzi
(Cyclical component of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cyc outputt -0.0052*** -0.0040*** -0.0059*** -0.0036*** -0.0074*** -0.0067*** -0.0069*** -0.0044***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Cyc outputt 1 0.0066*** 0.0065*** 0.0061*** 0.0062***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Cyc outputt 2 0.0050*** 0.0052*** 0.0039*** 0.0047***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Avg growth (7yr) 0.8948*** 0.2965** 0.7576*** 0.1228
(0.1187) (0.1211) (0.1217) (0.1243)
Log total assets -0.0267*** -0.0258*** -0.0251*** -0.0258***
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0011)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N N N N N N N
Firms 11232 11232 10196 10187 11232 11231 10196 10187
Avg. obs/firm 16.75 16.72 11.25 11.25 14.88 14.86 11.16 11.15
Std coe↵ (pp) -0.45 -0.34 -0.50 -0.31 -0.63 -0.57 -0.59 -0.37
Uncond prob 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether a firm is in a Ponzi regime in a given year. ‘Cyc output’
denotes the cyclical component of GDP obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott filter. ‘Avg growth (7 yr)’ denotes the average
growth in aggregate GDP over the previous seven years. ‘Std coe↵ (pp)’ denotes the percentage point e↵ect of a one standard
deviation increase in ‘Cyc output’ on the probability of being Ponzi. ‘Uncond prob’ denotes the unconditional probability of
being Ponzi. GDP data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained dollar measures); for all other definitions and data
sources, see Section 2. The sample period is 1970-2014. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05;
***p < 0.01.
Table 8 begins with specifications using the cyclical component of output. This specification is premised
on the assumption that the cyclical component of aggregate GDP reflects changes in economic conditions
17Both aggregate GDP and sector-level output series, introduced below, are normalized such that 2009, the base year, is
equal to 100. Doing so ensures comparability between aggregate GDP and the sector-level output measures that are used in
estimations in Appendix A2. Both aggregate GDP and sector-level output are drawn from the BEA (chained dollar measures).
In all sets of regressions, we restrict the sample to only include firms with spells of at least seven consecutive observations;
however, the results are strongly robust to varying this sample restriction.
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that may a↵ect financing structures, but that are exogenous to individual firms. Thus, the primary relation-
ship of interest is between the contemporaneous cyclical component of GDP and the probability of being
Ponzi, described by the coe cients in the first row of each column in Table 8. In particular, if business
cycle fluctuations drive changes in firm financing regimes, we would expect that business cycle downturns
(expansions) lead to an increase (decrease) in the probability that a firm is Ponzi.
Columns 1 and 2 begin with the most parsimonious specifications, estimating the relationship between
the contemporaneous cyclical component of GDP and the probability of being Ponzi, both with and without
a control for log of total assets to capture firm size. Each column also includes firm fixed e↵ects that account
for firm-specific factors (like sector of activity) that are not explicitly controlled for in the regression; because
the aggregate output gap absorbs year-specific variation, year fixed e↵ects are not included. As predicted
by the hypothesis that Minskian dynamics describe short-term fluctuations, the key coe cient of interest
in Columns 1 and 2 points to a negative and strongly statistically significant relationship between the
contemporaneous cyclical component of output and the probability of being Ponzi.
Importantly, however, the magnitude of the estimated coe cient is small. To highlight economic mag-
nitudes, standardized coe cients for cyclical output are included in the final row of Table 8. In Column 1,
for example, a one standard deviation increase in the magnitude of the cyclical component of GDP leads
to a 0.45 percentage point decline in the probability of being Ponzi. A comparison to the unconditional
probability of being Ponzi (17.5%) highlights the small economic magnitude of the estimate. When also
controlling for log total assets, a one standard deviation increase in the cyclical component of GDP leads
to a 0.34 percentage point decline in the probability of being Ponzi. Thus, while – as expected – these
results point to a negative contemporaneous relationship between the cyclical component of GDP and the
probability of being Ponzi, the magnitude of this short run e↵ect is quite small.
This result is corroborated by the remaining columns of Table 8. Columns 3 and 4 include a measure
of seven-year average growth, defined by the average growth rate over the last seven years, to consider the
possibility that periods of faster growth subsequently generate greater financial fragility. Columns 5-8 then
replicate the four initial specifications, while also including two lags of the cyclical component of output.
Thus, Column 8 presents the most exhaustive specification, which includes controls for two lags of the
cyclical component of output, seven-year average growth, and log of total assets. Column 8 reiterates both
the negative relationship between the cyclical component of GDP and the probability of being Ponzi, and the
very small economic magnitude of this coe cient. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in average
growth is associated with a 0.62 percentage point increase in the probability of being Ponzi.
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Two additional points are useful to note about Table 8. First, Columns 5-8 point to a positive rela-
tionship between the first and second lags of cyclical output and the probability of being Ponzi. These
coe cients reflect mean reversal in the cyclical component of output, as measured by the Hodrick-Prescott
filter. In particular, when holding the contemporaneous component of cyclical output fixed, subsequent lags
of cyclical output capture this mean reversion, such that they are positively associated with the probability
of being Ponzi. Finally, the coe cient describing the relationship between seven-year average growth and the
probability of being Ponzi is positive and strongly statistically significant across specifications, suggesting
that a spell of medium-run growth is associated with an increased likelihood that firms are Ponzi. This coef-
ficient may, accordingly, suggest that sustained growth episodes breed ‘exuberance’ and, thus, the behavior
that generates financial fragility. However, as with the contemporaneous cyclical component of output, the
magnitude of the coe cient is, again, quite small. In Column 7, a one standard deviation increase in seven
year average growth leads to a 0.65 percentage point increase in the probability of being Ponzi; when con-
trolling for total assets (Column 8), the magnitude of this e↵ect falls to 0.11 percentage points and becomes
statistically insignificant.
Table 9: Linear probability models: probability of being Ponzi
Real GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 (real gdp)t -0.2902*** -0.3636*** -0.4871*** -0.5175*** -0.3192*** -0.4044*** -0.4616*** -0.4900***
(0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0448) (0.0447) (0.0382) (0.0381) (0.0463) (0.0461)
 (real gdp)t 1 -0.0599 -0.1039*** -0.1375*** -0.1327***
(0.0386) (0.0385) (0.0471) (0.0469)
 (real gdp)t 2 0.1306*** 0.0746** 0.0048 0.0171
(0.0374) (0.0373) (0.0451) (0.0449)
Avg growth (7yr) 1.0543*** 0.5493*** 1.1481*** 0.6097***
(0.1184) (0.1199) (0.1340) (0.1355)
Log total assets -0.0273*** -0.0265*** -0.0260*** -0.0262***
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0011)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N N N N N N N
Firms 11232 11232 10196 10187 11232 11231 10196 10187
Avg. obs/firm 16.75 16.72 11.25 11.25 14.88 14.86 11.16 11.15X
Output Gap -0.248 -0.434 -0.594 -0.606
p-value 1.51e-05 0 0 0
Std coe↵ (pp) -0.58 -0.73 -0.97 -1.03 -0.64 -0.81 -0.92 -0.98
Uncond prob 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether a firm is in a Ponzi regime in a given year. ‘ (real gdp)’
denotes real GDP growth. ‘Avg growth (7 yr)’ denotes the average growth in aggregate GDP over the previous seven years.
‘Std coe↵ (pp)’ denotes the percentage point e↵ect of a one standard deviation increase in ‘ (real gdp)’ on the probability
of being Ponzi. ‘Uncond prob’ denotes the unconditional probability of being Ponzi. GDP data is drawn from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (chained dollar measures); for all other definitions and data sources, see Section 2. The sample period is
1970-2014. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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These results are corroborated by alternative specifications utilizing output growth, rather than the
cyclical component of aggregate output. The results, shown in Table 9, indicate that a higher rate of GDP
growth leads to a lower probability of being in a Ponzi regime, such that that expansions are associated with
a decreased probability of fragile finance, whereas downturns increase firms’ likelihood of being in a fragile
regime. Like in Table 8, however, the coe cients in these estimations are small. In the most parsimonious
specification in Column 1, for example, a one standard deviation increase in GDP growth leads to a 0.58
percentage point decline in the probability of being Ponzi; in Column 8 this magnitude is 0.98 percentage
points. The magnitude of the sum of the lagged coe cients is, also, small; a one standard deviation increase in
the sum of the lagged coe cients on real GDP growth is associated with a 0.97 percentage point decline in the
probability of being Ponzi. In addition to these specifications, Appendix A2 includes analysis exploring the
robustness of these results to panel logit specifications; specifications that use sectoral, rather than aggregate,
output gaps and output growth; and specifications that consider the probability of being speculative or Ponzi.
This robustness analysis corroborates our conclusion that the probability of being Ponzi – and the distribution
of regimes more generally – are largely insensitive to short-run fluctuations in economic activity.18
4.2 A continuous measure of financial fragility
Finally, we consider the sensitivity of our conclusions to an extension that utilizes the interest coverage ratio.
The interest coverage ratio allows us, first, to move beyond the question of how business cycle fluctuations
a↵ect binary financing classifications to an analysis drawing on the full distribution of a continuous measure
of fragility. Second, we can analyze if the low estimated e↵ects in Section 4.1 mask di↵erential e↵ects of
business cycle conditions at quantiles of interest coverage away from the mean. Importantly, business cycle
fluctuations are expected to impact firms di↵erentially depending on the degree to which their cash inflows
depend on current earnings from operations, which are likely more sensitive to business cycle variations than
other cash inflows. Arguably, this is likely to be the case for the smaller firms in our sample; these firms
are also more likely to be in lower quantiles of the interest coverage distribution. As was shown in Figure
4, the distribution of the interest coverage ratio is highly skewed, supporting the expectation of a di↵erent
estimated e↵ect at the mean than at the tails. Specifically, large firms are more likely to have positive
18In Appendix A2 we, first, show that the main results are robust to a panel logit specification (Table 14). We present linear
probability models in the main text due to the relative ease of interpretation; however, because we have an unbalanced panel it
is important that the results are robust to logit specifications. We, second, show that the results are robust to instead using a
sector-specific – rather than aggregate – output gap (Table 15). By introducing variation masked in the cyclical component of
aggregate output, these sector-level series allow us to consider the possibility that this sectoral variation increases the estimated
magnitudes in Table 8. We, similarly, replicate the linear probability models that use GDP growth in Table 9 using sector-level
output growth (Table 16). Finally, we estimate the probability of being speculative or Ponzi, rather than simply Ponzi, with
linear probability models and panel logit specifications (Tables 17 and 18).
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interest coverage and, accordingly, are less likely to be in a Ponzi regime. Larger firms are also arguably less
dependent on current sales to generate cash flows, as opposed to non-operational sources of income stemming
from the ownership of assets.
It is, therefore, plausible that the impact of current business cycle conditions on interest coverage di↵ers
at di↵erent quantiles of its distribution. To investigate this hypothesis we use the recentered influence
function (RIF) regression to estimate the e↵ect of the cyclical component of GDP (Table 10) and GDP
growth (Table 11) at di↵erent quantiles of the interest coverage distribution (Firpo et al., 2009).19 Like
standard OLS regressions estimate the impact of an independent variable on the unconditional mean of
the dependent variable, RIF-regressions estimate the impacts on unconditional quantiles of the dependent
variable. Table 10 shows the e↵ects of variation in the (normalized) cyclical component of aggregate GDP on
the interest coverage ratio. Columns 1-2 shows the estimated e↵ect on the mean, obtained from a standard
fixed e↵ects regression, and Columns 3-8 show estimates of the cyclical component of overall GDP on the
1st, 5th and 8th unconditional deciles, obtained from the RIF-regressions. These estimations suggest that
changes in the cyclical component of GDP have a larger impact on lower deciles of the interest coverage
measure than on the mean, the median, or upper deciles.20
Despite these di↵erential e↵ects, however, the quantile regressions again point to very small short-run
e↵ects of cyclical GDP on interest coverage and, by implication, on financial fragility. For example, Column
1 of Table 10 estimates that a one standard deviation increase in normalized GDP (0.73 in the 1950-2014
period) raises the mean of the interest coverage measure by only 0.002. In comparison to the unconditional
mean of the interest coverage ratio of 0.06, the e↵ect amounts to a 3.3% increase. Column 2, in turn,
suggests that the same shock would raise interest coverage at the first decile by 0.0047. In our sample, the
value of interest coverage at that quantile is -0.086, still a relatively small e↵ect and certainly not one that
would su ce to elicit a regime switch. In fact, empirically plausible cyclical fluctuations suggest a regime
switch only for those firms that are already near the cut-o↵ of zero interest coverage, beyond which they
would switch from Ponzi to speculative. Interest coverage of (approximately) zero corresponds to the 16th
percentile of the distribution; a one-standard deviation increase in cyclical GDP could cause many of those
marginal firms to switch out of their Ponzi regimes. But, as suggested by the linear probability models
19Because interest coverage does not require data on principal payments, the quantile regressions cover 1950-2014. However,
the results are qualitatively robust to excluding the pre-1970 period, thereby defining the sample period analagously to the
period used in the linear probability models above.
20This finding is corroborated by the first panel of Figure 6 in Appendix A2, which presents estimates from the 10th to
the 90th percentile in increments of five. Figure 6 shows a relatively smooth, monotonic decline in the estimated coe cient
until approximately the median of the interest coverage measure, with the impact on the first decile estimated to be over three
times larger than on percentiles above the median. Tables 19 and 20 in Appendix A2, furthermore, indicate that the results in
Tables 10 and 11 are robust to the sectoral output gap and sectoral output growth, respectively.
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Table 10: E↵ects of the output gap by quantile on the interest coverage ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Mean Decile 1 Decile 1 Median Median Decile 8 Decile 8
Cyc outputt 0.0031*** 0.0039*** 0.0066*** 0.0073*** 0.0019*** 0.0021*** 0.0019*** 0.0021***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Cyc outputt 1 -0.0037*** -0.0057*** -0.0017*** -0.0018***
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0006)
Cyc outputt 2 -0.0022*** -0.0053*** -0.0015*** -0.0020***
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N N N N N N N
Obs 226381 226381 226381 226381 226381 226381 226381 226381
Note: The dependent variable is interest coverage as a ratio of total assets. ‘Cyc output’ denotes the cyclical component of GDP
obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Column (1)-(2) shows the estimated e↵ect of the (normalized) cyclical component of
overall GDP on the population mean of the dependent variable obtained through a standard fixed-e↵ects regression. Columns
(3)-(8) show the estimates of the overall output gap on the 10th, 50th and 80th unconditional percentiles of the interest coverage
ratio, obtained through the Recentered Influence Function (Rif) regression. For computational e ciency, we use demeaned data
in the estimations; the reported standard errors are adjusted to reflect the correct number of degrees of freedom. GDP data is
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained dollar measures); for all other definitions and data sources, see Section 2. The
sample period is 1950-2014. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 11: E↵ects of GDP growth by quantile on the interest coverage ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Mean Decile 1 Decile 1 Median Median Decile 8 Decile 8
 (real gdp)t 0.1283*** 0.1222*** 0.2661*** 0.2416*** 0.1197*** 0.1129*** 0.0763*** 0.0744***
(0.0187) (0.0183) (0.0294) (0.0302) (0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0163) (0.0169)
 (real gdp)t 1 -0.0248 0.0383 0.0081 -0.0238
(0.0155) (0.0292) (0.0069) (0.0170)
 (real gdp)t 2 -0.0959*** -0.1377*** -0.0427*** -0.0586***
(0.0173) (0.0286) (0.0067) (0.0166)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N N N N N N N
Obs 226381 226381 226381 226381 226381 226381 226381 226381X
  ln(rgdp) 0.00148 0.142 0.0782 -0.00797
p-value 0.968 0.00209 0 0.754
Notes: The dependent variable is interest coverage as a ratio of total assets.  (real gdp) denotes real GDP growth. Columns
(1)-(2) show the estimated e↵ect of real GDP growth on the population mean of the dependent variable, obtained through
a standard fixed-e↵ects regression. Columns (3)-(8) show the estimates of the overall output gap on the 10th, 50th and
80th unconditional percentiles of the interest coverage ratio, obtained through the Recentered Influence (Rif) regression. For
computational e ciency, we use demeaned data in the estimations; the reported standard errors are adjusted to reflect the
correct number of degrees of freedom. GDP data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained dollar measures); for all
other definitions and data sources, see Section 2. The sample period is 1950-2014. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
25
described above, their proportion as a share of the total number of Ponzi firms would be small.
Finally, Table 11 tells a qualitatively similar story for changes in real GDP growth.21 Again, the coe -
cients on contemporaneous growth are about 2.5 times larger for the first decile than at the median and at
larger quantiles. The impact of a one-standard deviation (calculated for the 1950-2014 period and measured
in decimal points) increase in real GDP growth (0.023) on interest coverage is 0.006 on the first decile and
0.002 on the mean — in line with the e↵ects obtained from the analysis of cyclical GDP.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we apply Minsky’s definitions of financial fragility to firm-level financial statements to develop
a picture of the incidence and evolution of Minsky’s financing regimes across the nonfinancial corporate
sector in the post-1970 US economy. The empirical mapping of Minskian concepts onto firm-level accounts
provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first explicit empirical application of Minsky’s taxonomy of
financial fragility at the firm level. This mapping, in turn, provides an empirical basis for exploring two sets
of questions. First, what is the incidence and distribution of Minsky’s financing regimes across nonfinancial
corporations in the post-1970 US economy? Second, are business cycle movements associated with changes
in the probability of a firm being in a more/less fragile financing regime?
These questions contribute, first, to an empirical understanding of the incidence and evolution of Minskian
regimes in the post-1970 US. While partly governed by data availability, the post-1970 period is nonetheless
a natural choice for analysis, given widespread attention to this period as one during which much of the
regulatory apparatus of the initial post-WWII period was dismantled, as well as due to a concurrent expansion
in the size of finance and changes in the financial behavior of nonfinancial corporations. The empirical
application of Minsky’s taxonomy in this paper contributes to this discussion by providing a novel empirical
application of this widely-studied approach to financial fragility. Importantly, despite a large theoretical
literature in a Minskian tradition, empirical analyses are sparse; the firm-level description of the evolution
and incidence of financing regimes over an extended period of time in the US, accordingly, contributes to
this literature by providing empirical context for Minskian regimes in one country over an important period
of time.
Additionally, this paper speaks to a long-standing point of ambiguity in the theoretical literature regarding
the duration of Minskian cycles. Detailed firm-level data provide a unique forum to approach this debate.
21Again see Figure 6 in Appendix A2 for estimates across a range of percentiles.
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In particular, firm-level data allow us to distinguish dynamics at the heart of short cycles versus longer
waves: namely, by distinguishing cycles driven by frequent ‘switching’ between regimes at the firm level –
from robust to fragile, and back to robust – from cycles characterized by a long-term widespread expansion
of fragility at the sector level. These longer-term dynamics are characterized by changes in financial norms
that operate across the sector. In the post-1970 US, for example, increased access to equity financing from
venture capital is arguably linked to changing norms regarding the financial requirements an enterprise must
meet before making an initial public o↵ering.
We highlight, in particular, a secular expansion in the incidence of Ponzi finance in the post-1970 US,
consistent with a long wave in the distribution of firms across Minksian financing regimes; however, we find
evidence of only very small Minskian cycles at short cycle frequencies. Thus, while our results point to a
build-up of fragility within the nonfinancial corporate sector over a series of business cycles, they do not lend
strong support to approaching Minskian dynamics as a theory of the business cycle, or as theories of nested
short- and longer-term Minskian cycles. Our results, therefore, build on a subset of the Minskian literature
– including seminal contributions by Minsky himself – that emphasizes the operation of Minskian dynamics
on a long-term basis.
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A Appendix
A.1 Details on the sectoral decomposition
To analyze the extent to which growth in Ponzi finance reflects changes in the sectoral composition of the
nonfinancial corporate sector, versus changes in the distribution of financing regimes within sectors, we
divide the sample into 13 sectors, summarized in Table 12. These sectors roughly correspond to the major
divisions of the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) (at the 4 digit level), and also include three high-tech
sectors, which are composite categories drawing from the other sectors (based on the legacy classification
of the formerly TechAmerica, now CompTIA, foundation). The three ‘high-tech’ sectors include high-tech
manufacturing, communications services, and software and computer-related services.22
Table 12: Sectoral Classification
Sector SIC Code Sector SIC Code
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0100-0999 Other Services 7000-8999a
Mining 1000-1499 Non-operating Establishments 9995
Construction 1500-1799 Conglomerates 9997
Manufacturing (excl. High tech.) 2000-3999b
Transportation and Public Utilities 4000-4999c High-technology Manufacturing 3571, 3572,3575,3577-3579,3651,
Wholesale Trade 5000-5199 3652,3661,3663,3669,3671,3672,
Retail Trade 5200-5999 3675-3679,3674,3821-3826,3829,
3827,3861,3812,3844,3845
Communications Services 4812-4813,4841,4899
Software and Computing Services 7371-7379
Notes: The SIC codes for High-technology Manufacturing, Communications Services, and Software and Computing Services follow
the legacy classification suggested by the formerly TechAmerica (now CompTIA) foundation. The legacy classification is currently
under revision, but it could be originally accessed at http://www.techamerica.org/sic-definition. For an example of a recent paper
using this classification, see Engelen et al. (2016).
aExcludes the codes listed under Software and Computing Services.
bExcludes the codes listed under High-technology Manufacturing
cExcludes the codes listed under Communications Services.
Table 13 provides summary statistics by sector. The top panel shows the distribution of firms in the
sample by sector over four periods: 1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000, 2000-2014. To ensure consistency
with our decomposition procedure described below, Table 13 presents period averages computed as simple
arithmetic averages of the values in the first and final year. Note that ‘traditional’ manufacturing firms (i.e.
excluding high-tech manufacturing) account for almost half of all firms in 1970-1980 and, while this share
declines to 35% by 2000-2014, the sector remains the largest throughout the sample period. The fastest rates
22Examples of high-tech manufacturing include industrial and consumer electronics, semiconductors, optical instruments and
elctromedical equipment; examples of software and computer services include programming and systems design, information
retrieval services, and prepackaged software.
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of expansion are recorded by ‘other’ services, whose average share rose from 8.4% to 15.5%, and software
and computing services, whose average share rose from 1.4% to 6.5%.
Table 13: Descriptive Statistics by Sector
Sectoral Shares of Firms in Sample (Period Avg., %)
1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2014
Agriculture 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
Mining 6.3 6.4 5.3 6.1
Construction 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.2
Manufacturing (excl. high-tech.) 47.8 37.7 33.8 35.3
Transportation and Pub. Utilities 8.5 11.5 9.9 9.4
Wholesale Trade 5.1 5.2 4.7 3.9
Retail Trade 9.0 8.1 7.5 6.8
Other Services 8.4 10.5 13.6 15.3
Non-operating Establishments 0.8 1.6 2.0 1.5
Conglomerates 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
High-technology Manufacturing 8.5 10.8 11.8 10.6
Communications 2.1 3.0 3.5 2.8
Software and Computing Services 1.4 3.1 6.2 6.5
Share of Ponzi Firms in Sector (Period Avg., %)
1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2014
Agriculture 9.4 21.9 27.6 21.2
Mining 13.8 16.6 25.1 32.0
Construction 7.9 17.3 20.9 14.0
Manufacturing (excl. high-tech.) 10.0 16.7 27.8 36.6
Transportation and Pub. Utilities 3.6 7.2 11.7 10.3
Wholesale Trade 9.7 16.6 23.4 19.5
Retail Trade 6.0 14.0 22.4 17.1
Other Services 11.4 18.9 32.6 35.3
Non-operating Establishments 14.7 36.5 57.9 77.1
Conglomerates 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5
High-technology Manufacturing 17.9 21.9 34.4 33.9
Communications 3.5 12.4 36.0 38.3
Software and Computing Services 19.4 21.1 45.1 46.9
All Sectors 10.0 16.7 29.1 32.8
Notes: The top panel shows the distribution of the firms in the sample, while the bottom panel shows the
share of Ponzi firms in each sector. All figures are period averages computed as simple arithmetic averages
of the values recorded in the first and in the final years of the periods, to ensure consistency with our
decomposition procedure. For a detailed description of the sectoral classification see the text in Appendix
A1. For all other definitions and data sources, see Section 2.
The bottom panel of Table 13 shows the share of Ponzi firms in each sector across the same four periods.
Two main patterns stand out. First, there is substantial variation over time and across sectors. A standard
variance decomposition procedure applied to the period averages on Table 13 finds near identical values
for both the within-sector and between-sector components of the overall standard deviation – about 10
percentage points each.23 In addition to cross-sector variation, nearly all sectors display a noticeable increase
23The decomposition of the overall standard deviation uses the following transformation: P˜i,p = Pi,p   P¯i + P¯ . Where P
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in the share of Ponzi firms between 1970-1980 and 1990-2000. The share in the communications sector
increases tenfold (from 3.5% to 36%), and nearly triples in manufacturing (excluding high-tech) and ‘other’
services sectors. The 2000-2014 trajectory shows more heterogeneity: there is a mix of increasing, stable
and decreasing shares. The combined e↵ect of these trends is, in part, responsible for the relative stability
of the aggregate share of Ponzi firms after 2000.
We decompose the change in the aggregate incidence of Ponzi regimes in these four periods into a ‘within-
sector’ component’ (the change in the incidence of Ponzi regimes within sectors, holding the sectoral shares
of the total number of firms fixed), and a ‘between-sector’ or ‘structural change’ component (the change in
the sectoral shares, holding the incidence of Ponzi regimes within sectors fixed). We adopt a variation of
a standard decomposition proposed by Timmer et al. (2014), which assigns a structural change component
only to sectors that expand their share of total firms in the sample. Let J denote the set of sectors whose
share fell between t and t  k, and let K denote the set whose share expanded. Then:
 Pt =
NX
i=1
S¯i P(i,t) +
X
i2K
 S(i,t)(P¯i   P¯J) (1)
where i denotes sector; Pi,t is the share of Ponzi firms in sector i at time t; Si,t denotes the share of sector
i in total firms in the sample at time t, and P¯J is the average share of Ponzi firms in shrinking sectors,
weighted by the decline in each sector’s employment share:
P¯J =
X
i2J
(STi   S0i )P¯iX
i2J
(STi   S0i )
(2)
The decomposition in Equation (1) assigns the structural change component only to expanding sectors,
in proportion to the di↵erence between a sector’s average share of Ponzi firms and the average share of Ponzi
firms in the shrinking sectors (given by Equation 2).24 As an example, suppose the share of software firms
denotes the share of Ponzi firms, i denotes sectors, and p denotes periods. P¯i denotes the average of P across periods in
sector i, and P¯ denotes the overall average of P . The within-sector standard deviation is the standard deviation of P˜i,p; the
between-sector standard deviation the standard deviation of P¯i across all sectors.
24This decomposition is one example of a broader class of decompositions that can be expressed as:
 Pt =
NX
i=1
S¯i P(i,t) +
NX
i=1
P¯i S(i,t)
where Pt denote the aggregate share of Ponzi firms at time t. A bar over a variable denotes its average between times t and
t   k. This equation(3) shows that the change in the aggregate share of Ponzi firms is equal to the sum of (1) within-sector
changes in the share of Ponzi firms, weighted by the average sectoral shares between the two periods, and (2) the sum of changes
in the sectoral shares in the total number of firms, weighted by the average share of Ponzi firms within each sector. The first
term captures the within-sector component of the aggregate change, and the second captures the structural change component.
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Figure 5: Sectoral contributions to change in aggregate share of Ponzi firms;
% of the observed change
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(b) 1980-1990
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(d) 2000-2014
Notes: The figure shows sectoral contributions to the aggregate share of Ponzi firms for four sub-periods of the
full sample period: 1970-1980; 1980-1990; 1990-2000; 2000-2014. All data are period averages computed as simple
arithmetic averages of the values recorded in the first and in the final years of the periods, to ensure consistency
with the decomposition procedure. For details of the sectoral classification and decomposition procedure used to
generate these figures see the text in Appendix A1. For all other definitions and data sources, see Section 2.
increases at the expense of retail firms between 1980 and 1990, all else equal. In this case, the software sector
is assigned a positive structural change contribution, as its average share of Ponzi firms is higher than that
in retail in during the period (see Table 13). The retail sector is assigned a structural change contribution of
zero. The results of this decomposition procedure are summarized in Table 4 in the text. Figure 5 provides a
graphical presentation of these results, examining the contribution of each sector to observed changes in the
aggregate share of Ponzi firms on account of the within-sector (the dark gray bars) and structural change
components (the light gray bars). Individual contributions are shown as percentages of the change in the
aggregate share of Ponzi firms in the period.
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A.2 Additional regression results
Table 14: Marginal e↵ects, logit estimations, probability of being Ponzi
(Cyclical component of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cyc outputt -0.0158*** -0.0926*** -0.0746***
(0.0024) (0.0123) (0.0161)
Cyc outputt 1 0.0829*** 0.0889***
(0.0132) (0.0166)
Cyc outputt 2 0.0651*** 0.0668***
(0.0128) (0.0162)
 (real gdp)t -3.7350*** -4.3726*** -6.4699***
(0.4241) (0.4916) (0.6412)
 (real gdp)t 1 -0.7987 -1.8234***
(0.5050) (0.6766)
 (real gdp)t 1 1.9483*** 0.7330
(0.4868) (0.6481)
Avg growth (7yr) 8.3424*** 13.4385***
(1.8080) (1.9373)
Log total assets -0.3303*** -0.3307***
(0.0148) (0.0147)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N N N N N
Firms 6326 5898 3968 6326 5898 3968
Avg. obs/firm 17.16 15.58 14.12 17.16 15.58 14.12
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether a firm is in a Ponzi regime in a given year.
The estimations show the marginal e↵ects from panel logit estimations: the change in the probability of being
Ponzi for a 1% change in ‘Cyc output’ and ‘ (real gdp)’ respectively. ‘Cyc output’ denotes the cyclical component
of GDP obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott filter. ‘ (real gdp)’ denotes real GDP growth. ‘Avg growth (7 yr)’
denotes the average growth in aggregate GDP over the previous seven years. Note that the logit estimations
exclude all firms that do not see a transition into or out of Ponzi; as a result, the sample size is smaller than in
the case of the linear probability models. GDP data is drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained
dollar measures); for all other definitions and data sources, see Section 2. The sample period is 1970-2014. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table 15: Linear probability models, probability of being Ponzi
(Cyclical component of sectoral output)
Cyc outputt -0.0015*** -0.0012*** -0.0026*** -0.0019*** -0.0023*** -0.0022*** -0.0030*** -0.0025***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Cyc outputt 1 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0013*** 0.0013***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Cyc outputt 2 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0011*** 0.0011***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Log total assets -0.0267*** -0.0230*** -0.0251*** -0.0232***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Avg growth (7yr) 0.6355*** 0.4291*** 0.5810*** 0.3959***
(0.0712) (0.0715) (0.0729) (0.0731)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N N N N N N N
Firms 11232 11232 11232 11223 11232 11231 11232 11223
Avg. obs/firm 16.75 16.72 12.41 12.40 14.88 14.86 12.02 12.01
Std Coe↵ (pp) -0.43 -0.35 -0.74 -0.55 -0.66 -0.62 -0.85 -0.70
Uncond prob 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether a firm is in a Ponzi regime in a given year. ‘Cyc output’
denotes the cyclical component of sectoral GDP obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott filter. ‘Avg growth (7 yr)’ denotes the
average growth in aggregate GDP over the previous seven years. ‘Std coe↵ (pp)’ denotes the percentage point e↵ect of a
one standard deviation increase in ‘Cyc output’ on the probability of being Ponzi. ‘Uncond prob’ denotes the unconditional
probability of being Ponzi. Sectoral GDP data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained dollar measures); there are
nine sectors, based on standard SIC classifications. For all other definitions and data sources, see Section 2. The sample period
is 1970-2014. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
36
Table 16: Linear probability models, probability of being Ponzi
(Real sector-level output growth)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 (real gdp)t -0.1219*** -0.1289*** -0.1656*** -0.1564*** -0.1320*** -0.1483*** -0.1934*** -0.1905***
(0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0190) (0.0190)
 (real gdp)t 1 -0.0462*** -0.0546*** -0.0997*** -0.0898***
(0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0181) (0.0181)
 (real gdp)t 2 0.0115 0.0058 -0.0418** -0.0331*
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0180) (0.0180)
Avg growth (7yr) 0.5238*** 0.3808*** 0.7327*** 0.5901***
(0.0656) (0.0657) (0.0760) (0.0760)
Log total assets -0.0270*** -0.0234*** -0.0255*** -0.0235***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N N N N N N N
Firms 11232 11232 11232 11223 11232 11231 11232 11223
Avg. obs/firm 16.75 16.72 12.41 12.40 14.88 14.86 12.02 12.01
Industry-Year FE N N N NX
Output Gap -0.167 -0.197 -0.335 -0.313
p-value 1.56e-08 0 0 0
Std coe↵ (pp) -0.55 -0.59 -0.75 -0.71 -0.60 -0.67 -0.88 -0.88
Uncond prob 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether a firm is in a Ponzi regime in a given year. ‘ (real gdp)’
denotes sector-level real output growth. The cyclical component of sectoral GDP obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
‘Avg growth (7 yr)’ denotes the average growth in aggregate GDP over the previous seven years. ‘Std coe↵ (pp)’ denotes the
percentage point e↵ect of a one standard deviation increase in ‘ (real gdp)’ on the probability of being Ponzi. ‘Uncond prob’
denotes the unconditional probability of being Ponzi. Sectoral GDP data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained
dollar measures); there are nine sectors, based on standard SIC classifications. For all other definitions and data sources, see
Section 2. The sample period is 1970-2014. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table 17: Linear probability model, speculative/Ponzi
(Cyclical component of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cyc outputt -0.0124*** -0.0145*** -0.0134***
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Cyc outputt 1 0.0103*** 0.0099***
(0.0012) (0.0014)
Cyc outputt 2 0.0101*** 0.0099***
(0.0012) (0.0014)
 (real GDP)t -0.9052*** -0.8404*** -0.9892***
(0.0405) (0.0454) (0.0568)
 (real GDP)t 1 -0.2879*** -0.3902***
(0.0459) (0.0578)
 (real GDP)t 2 0.1379*** 0.0387
(0.0444) (0.0553)
Avg growth (7yr) 0.9535*** 1.8244***
(0.1531) (0.1668)
Log total assets 0.0052*** 0.0038***
(0.0013) (0.0013)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N N N N N
Firms 11232 11232 10187 11232 11232 10187
Avg. obs/firm 16.75 14.88 11.15 16.75 14.88 11.15
Std coe↵ (pp) -1.06 -1.23 -1.14 -1.81 -1.68 -1.975
Uncond prob 75.5 75.5 75.5 75.5 75.5 75.5
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether a firm is speculative or Ponzi in a given
year. Note that one minus the probability of being speculative or Ponzi defines the probability of being hedge. ‘Cyc
output’ denotes the cyclical component of GDP obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott filter. ‘ (real gdp)’ denotes
sector-level real output growth ‘Avg growth (7 yr)’ denotes the average growth in aggregate GDP over the previous
seven years. ‘Std coe↵ (pp)’ denotes the percentage point e↵ect of a one standard deviation increase in ‘Cyc
output’ or ‘ (real gdp)’ on the probability of being Ponzi. ‘Uncond prob’ denotes the unconditional probability of
being speculative or Ponzi. GDP data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained dollar measures); for all
other definitions and data sources, see Section 2. The sample period is 1970-2014. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table 18: Marginal e↵ects, logit estimations, speculative/Ponzi
(Cyclical component of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cyc outputt -0.0272*** -0.1360*** -0.1290***
(0.0020) (0.0106) (0.0133)
Cyc outputt 1 0.0963*** 0.0964***
(0.0111) (0.0133)
Cyc outputt 1 0.0888*** 0.0901***
(0.0105) (0.0125)
 (real GDP)t -7.9101*** -7.5899*** -9.2355***
(0.3554) (0.4102) (0.5376)
 (real GDP)t 1 -2.4868*** -3.4082***
(0.4063) (0.5306)
 (real GDP)t 2 1.2318*** 0.3410
(0.3886) (0.5058)
Avg growth (7yr) 8.2515*** 16.0901***
(1.3720) (1.5036)
Log total assets 0.0483*** 0.0305***
(0.0117) (0.0117)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N N N N N
Firms 7015 6446 4395 7015 6446 4395
Avg. obs/firm 18.84 17.57 16.41 18.84 17.57 16.41
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether a firm is speculative or Ponzi in a given
year. The estimations show the marginal e↵ects from panel logit estimations: the change in the probability of
being speculative or Ponzi for a 1% change in ‘Cyc output’ and ‘ (real gdp)’ respectively. Note that one minus
the probability of being speculative or Ponzi defines the probability of being hedge. ‘Cyc output’ denotes the cyclical
component of GDP obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott filter. ‘ (real gdp)’ denotes sector-level real output growth
‘Avg growth (7 yr)’ denotes the average growth in aggregate GDP over the previous seven years. Note that the
logit estimations exclude all firms that do not see a transition into or out of Ponzi; as a result, the sample size
is smaller than in the case of the linear probability models. GDP data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(chained dollar measures); for all other definitions and data sources, see Section 2. The sample period is 1970-2014.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table 19: E↵ects of the sectoral output gap by quantile on the interest coverage ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Mean Decile 1 Decile 1 Median Median Decile 8 Decile 8
Cyc outputt 0.0007*** 0.0011*** 0.0017*** 0.0021*** 0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0004*** 0.0009***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Cyc outputt 1 -0.0009*** -0.0011*** -0.0004*** -0.0007***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Cyc outputt 2 -0.0007*** -0.0012*** -0.0003*** -0.0004***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N N N N N N N
Obs 226381 207770 226381 207770 226381 207770 226381 207770
Note: The dependent variable is interest coverage as a ratio of total assets. ‘Cyc output’ denotes the cyclical component
of sectoral output obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Column (1)-(2) shows the estimated e↵ect of the (normalized)
cyclical component of overall GDP on the population mean of the dependent variable obtained through a standard fixed-e↵ects
regression. Columns (3)-(8) show the estimates of the sectoral output gap on the 10th, 50th and 80th unconditional percentiles
of the interest coverage ratio, obtained through the Recentered Influence Function (Rif) regression. For computational e ciency,
we use demeaned data in the estimations; the reported standard errors are adjusted to reflect the correct number of degrees
of freedom. Sectoral GDP data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained dollar measures); for all other definitions
and data sources, see Section 2. The sample period is 1950-2014. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 20: E↵ects of sectoral growth by quantile on the interest coverage ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Mean Decile 1 Decile 1 Median Median Decile 8 Decile 8
 (real gdp)t 0.0623*** 0.0695*** 0.1119*** 0.1089*** 0.0492*** 0.0516*** 0.0400*** 0.0436***
(0.0075) (0.0080) (0.0132) (0.0134) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0073) (0.0076)
 (real gdp)t 1 0.0221*** 0.0476*** 0.0189*** 0.0099
(0.0073) (0.0130) (0.0031) (0.0075)
 (real gdp)t 2 -0.0049 0.0045 0.0060* 0.0055
(0.0077) (0.0129) (0.0031) (0.0075)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N N N N N N N
Obs 217596 197361 217596 197361 217596 197361 217596 197361
Notes: The dependent variable is interest coverage as a ratio of total assets.  (real gdp) denotes real GDP growth. Columns
(1)-(2) show the estimated e↵ect of real sector-level output growth on the population mean of the dependent variable, obtained
through a standard fixed-e↵ects regression. Columns (3)-(8) show the estimates of sectoral growth on the 10th, 50th and
80th unconditional percentiles of the interest coverage ratio, obtained through the Recentered Influence (Rif) regression. For
computational e ciency, we use demeaned data in the estimations; the reported standard errors are adjusted to reflect the
correct number of degrees of freedom. Sectoral GDP data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained dollar measures);
for all other definitions and data sources, see Section 2. The sample period is 1950-2014. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure 6: E↵ects of the output gap by quantile on the interest coverage ratio
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Notes: The figure shows the unconditional quantile regression estimates for the e↵ect of the output gap and real
GDP on interest coverage as a ratio of total assets. The dependent variable is interest coverage as a ratio of
total assets. Estimates are shown of the overall output gap (panel (a)) and real GDP growth (panel (b)) across
the distribution of the interest coverage ratio, obtained through the Recentered Influence (Rif) regression. For
computational e ciency, we use demeaned data in the estimations; the reported standard errors are adjusted to
reflect the correct number of degrees of freedom. GDP data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (chained
dollar measures); for all other definitions and data sources, see Section 2. The sample period is 1950-2014. The
dotted lines show 95% confidence intervals defined by robust standard errors.
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